核心观点
北京时间8月22日（周五）晚，美联储主席在Jackson Hole年会上作题为《货币政策与美联储评估框架》（Monetary Policy and the Fed’s Framework Review）的演讲，提供了9月再次降息的指引，并公布联储修订后的货币政策框架。7月非农数据公布后联储降息预期一度明显回升，但近期市场担忧鲍威尔可能在Jackson Hole会议上维持鹰派立场，鲍威尔讲话前联储降息有所回撤。但是鲍威尔的讲话强调就业市场面临的下行风险，释放了9月降息的信号，整体表态偏鸽，市场降息预期有所升温，美股上涨，美元走弱。截至8月25日22：45，相较鲍威尔讲话前，2025年内市场降息预期上行8bp至57bp，2y、10y美债收益率分别下行9bp、4bp至3.69%、4.26%，美元指数下跌0.8%，三大股指明显反弹。
经济前景以及政策展望方面，鲍威尔立场偏鸽：一方面，他强调了就业市场面临下行风险；但另一方面，他认为虽然通胀存在上行风险，但关税对通胀影响偏“一次性”，淡化了通胀持续偏高的可能性；虽然仍然强调数据依赖（尤其非农数据），但给出了9月降息的明确指引。具体来看，
就业市场方面，鲍威尔认为虽然失业率未显著上行，但贸易与移民政策变化使得就业供需共同走弱，特别是劳动参与率下降从而使得新增就业的“均衡”水平下移，呈现出脆弱的平衡状态。一旦该平衡被打破，劳动力市场可能快速走弱。
通胀层面，鲍威尔仍维持关税对价格影响是一次性的判断。鲍威尔认为虽然关税对价格影响已经部分显现、传导也将持续，并且可能由于关税税率的持续变化而导致调整的过程延长，但不会造成持续性的通胀压力。此外，鲍威尔认为当前就业市场放缓的背景下，出现工资-通胀螺旋的概率较低，工资或难以成为通胀压力的来源，而市场与调查指标也显示长期通胀预期仍然锚定。
对增长的判断层面，鲍威尔指出上半年GDP增速放缓至1.2%，仅为去年同期增速的一半左右，背后主要是消费者支出的走弱，产出下降也有部分拖累。
有关货币政策展望，鲍威尔给出9月降息的较为明确指引。鲍威尔表示，虽然就业面临下行风险，通胀面临上行风险，但由于当前政策利率具有限制性，经济前景和风险要求联储调整政策立场，给出了9月会议将再次降息的较为明确指引。但是，鲍威尔也强调，货币政策没有预设的路径，联储只会根据经济数据（solely）来评估经济前景以及风险，从而决定货币政策。只会根据经济数据的表述也部分回应了近期特朗普对联储的施压。
货币政策框架评估上，鲍威尔公布对《长期目标和货币政策战略声明》的修改结果，与此前预期一致。2012年联储首次公布《长期目标和货币政策战略声明》，并在2019-2020年进行第一次货币政策框架评估后发布了2020年版本声明。对2008-2019年长期低通胀、低增长、低利率环境下联储货币政策操作的反思，2020年版本转向灵活的平均通胀目标制，更加强调应对就业不足等。2024年11月联储启动第二次货币政策框架评估，总结过去五年经济运行的经验教训，并公布了对《长期目标和货币政策战略声明》的四点修改。由于当前再次陷入上述“三低”的概率明显下降，修改后的声明更加接近2012年首次公布的声明结果，整体符合此前预期。
零利率下限不是当前政策关注的重心，删除零利率下限（ELB）是经济决定性特征的表述，转而强调货币政策框架旨在广泛经济环境下促进最大就业和物价稳定。
回归灵活通胀目标制框架（FIT），取消2020年平均通胀目标制（FAIT），即补偿策略。原因是，刻意保持适度通胀超调的理念已被证伪。
对货币政策如何应对最大就业政策进行修订。2020年声明中强调货币政策将应对就业不足（shortfalls），而不是对最大就业偏离（deviations）都要应对。Shortfalls的表述被认为联储放弃先发制人行动，或忽视劳动力市场收紧。本次修订删除了shortfalls表述，并修订为：就业水平有时可能超过实时评估的最大就业水平，而不必然对物价稳定构成风险；若劳动力市场紧张或其他因素对物价稳定构成风险时，采取先发制人的行动很可能是必要的。
调整措辞阐述在就业与通胀目标无法兼顾时的政策取向，即采取平衡策略推进双重目标。修订后的声明更贴近 2012 年原始表述框架。修订后的声明更贴近 2012 年原始表述框架。联储表示会考虑通胀与就业目标偏离的程度，以及各自回归至符合双重使命水平所需的不同时间跨度。
鲍威尔讲话释放了较为明确的9月降息的信号，我们维持年内再降息两次的预测，联储降息路径最关键的参考指标将是非农数据。7月非农就业数据显示就业市场下行风险加大，鲍威尔的讲话释放了较为明确的9月降息信号。9月会议前将公布8月非农和8月通胀数据，我们认为即使两个数据超预期，对联储9月降息决策的影响也可能有限，即使数据强劲，9月也会预防性降息。往前看，正如鲍威尔所强调的，未来的降息路径取决于后续数据的表现。如果四季度就业数据改善，或者通胀明显超预期，联储明年的降息节奏可能受影响。考虑到关税上升的拖累仍在、就业市场整体仍然存在风险，而通胀的传导较为温和（参见《关税传导或更为显性但短期影响可控》，2025/8/18），基准情形下，我们认为联储在9月降息后，四季度仍可能再次降息，2025年下半年降息2次。
此外，4季度开始更应关注FOMC委员和联储主席人选变化对明年货币政策方向和美元走势的影响。目前特朗普已经任命Miran暂时出任美联储理事，预计在9月后能够通过参议院的确认，其加入联储将加大鲍威尔所面临的压力。近期特朗普也加大了对联储理事Cook的施压力度，Cook目前否认将提前离职，特朗普后续是否会以Cook涉嫌抵押欺诈为由将其解雇仍然需要密切关注。此外，9月以后特朗普还可能给出联储主席的明确人选，市场对新主席的关注度将上升，相应的，鲍威尔讲话的影响力可能会下降。如果新任联储主席被市场认为缺乏独立性，可能导致美元被抛售。因此，四季度开始，关注联储人事变化对货币政策以及美元走势的影响。
风险提示：通胀再度回升导致联储鹰派超预期，高利率下美国金融风险暴露。
附录：联储长期目标和货币政策策略的声明（2025年VS 2024年）
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.
Employment, inflation, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. The Committee’s monetary policy strategy is designed to promote maximum employment and stable prices across a broad range of economic conditions. Monetary policy plays an important role in stabilizing the economy in response to these disturbances. Employment, inflation, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Monetary policy plays an important role in stabilizing the economy in response to these disturbances. The Committee’s primary means of adjusting the stance of monetary policy is through changes in the target range for the federal funds rate. The Committee judges that the level of the federal funds rate consistent with maximum employment and price stability over the longer run has declined relative to its historical average. Therefore, the federal funds rate is likely to be constrained by its effective lower bound more frequently than in the past. Owing in part to the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound, the Committee judges that downward risks to employment and inflation have increased. The Committee is prepared to use its full range of tools to achieve its maximum employment and price stability goals, particularly if the federal funds rate is constrained by its effective lower bound.
Durably achieving maximum employment fosters broad-based economic opportunities and benefits for all Americans. The Committee views maximum employment as the highest level of employment that can be achieved on a sustained basis in a context of price stability.
The maximum level of employment is a broad-based and inclusive goal that is not directly measurable and changes over time owing largely to nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee’s policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the shortfalls of employment from its maximum level, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments.
Price stability is essential for a sound and stable economy and supports the well-being of all Americans. The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee reaffirms its judgment that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate. The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee’s ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time. The Committee is prepared to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.
Monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity, employment, and prices with a lag. In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks over time to mitigate shortfalls of employment from the Committee’s assessment of its maximum level and deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal. Moreover, sustainably achieving maximum employment and price stability depends on a stable financial system. Therefore, the Committee’s policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee’s goals.
The Committee’s employment and inflation objectives are generally complementary. However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it takes into account the employment shortfalls and inflation deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate, taking into account the extent of departures from its goals and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. The Committee recognizes that employment may at times run above real-time assessments of maximum employment without necessarily creating risks to price stability.
The Committee intends to review these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January, and to undertake roughly every 5 years a thorough public review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices.
文章来源
核心观点
北京时间8月22日（周五）晚，美联储主席在Jackson Hole年会上作题为《货币政策与美联储评估框架》（Monetary Policy and the Fed’s Framework Review）的演讲，提供了9月再次降息的指引，并公布联储修订后的货币政策框架。7月非农数据公布后联储降息预期一度明显回升，但近期市场担忧鲍威尔可能在Jackson Hole会议上维持鹰派立场，鲍威尔讲话前联储降息有所回撤。但是鲍威尔的讲话强调就业市场面临的下行风险，释放了9月降息的信号，整体表态偏鸽，市场降息预期有所升温，美股上涨，美元走弱。截至8月25日22：45，相较鲍威尔讲话前，2025年内市场降息预期上行8bp至57bp，2y、10y美债收益率分别下行9bp、4bp至3.69%、4.26%，美元指数下跌0.8%，三大股指明显反弹。
经济前景以及政策展望方面，鲍威尔立场偏鸽：一方面，他强调了就业市场面临下行风险；但另一方面，他认为虽然通胀存在上行风险，但关税对通胀影响偏“一次性”，淡化了通胀持续偏高的可能性；虽然仍然强调数据依赖（尤其非农数据），但给出了9月降息的明确指引。具体来看，
就业市场方面，鲍威尔认为虽然失业率未显著上行，但贸易与移民政策变化使得就业供需共同走弱，特别是劳动参与率下降从而使得新增就业的“均衡”水平下移，呈现出脆弱的平衡状态。一旦该平衡被打破，劳动力市场可能快速走弱。
通胀层面，鲍威尔仍维持关税对价格影响是一次性的判断。鲍威尔认为虽然关税对价格影响已经部分显现、传导也将持续，并且可能由于关税税率的持续变化而导致调整的过程延长，但不会造成持续性的通胀压力。此外，鲍威尔认为当前就业市场放缓的背景下，出现工资-通胀螺旋的概率较低，工资或难以成为通胀压力的来源，而市场与调查指标也显示长期通胀预期仍然锚定。
对增长的判断层面，鲍威尔指出上半年GDP增速放缓至1.2%，仅为去年同期增速的一半左右，背后主要是消费者支出的走弱，产出下降也有部分拖累。
有关货币政策展望，鲍威尔给出9月降息的较为明确指引。鲍威尔表示，虽然就业面临下行风险，通胀面临上行风险，但由于当前政策利率具有限制性，经济前景和风险要求联储调整政策立场，给出了9月会议将再次降息的较为明确指引。但是，鲍威尔也强调，货币政策没有预设的路径，联储只会根据经济数据（solely）来评估经济前景以及风险，从而决定货币政策。只会根据经济数据的表述也部分回应了近期特朗普对联储的施压。
货币政策框架评估上，鲍威尔公布对《长期目标和货币政策战略声明》的修改结果，与此前预期一致。2012年联储首次公布《长期目标和货币政策战略声明》，并在2019-2020年进行第一次货币政策框架评估后发布了2020年版本声明。对2008-2019年长期低通胀、低增长、低利率环境下联储货币政策操作的反思，2020年版本转向灵活的平均通胀目标制，更加强调应对就业不足等。2024年11月联储启动第二次货币政策框架评估，总结过去五年经济运行的经验教训，并公布了对《长期目标和货币政策战略声明》的四点修改。由于当前再次陷入上述“三低”的概率明显下降，修改后的声明更加接近2012年首次公布的声明结果，整体符合此前预期。
零利率下限不是当前政策关注的重心，删除零利率下限（ELB）是经济决定性特征的表述，转而强调货币政策框架旨在广泛经济环境下促进最大就业和物价稳定。
回归灵活通胀目标制框架（FIT），取消2020年平均通胀目标制（FAIT），即补偿策略。原因是，刻意保持适度通胀超调的理念已被证伪。
对货币政策如何应对最大就业政策进行修订。2020年声明中强调货币政策将应对就业不足（shortfalls），而不是对最大就业偏离（deviations）都要应对。Shortfalls的表述被认为联储放弃先发制人行动，或忽视劳动力市场收紧。本次修订删除了shortfalls表述，并修订为：就业水平有时可能超过实时评估的最大就业水平，而不必然对物价稳定构成风险；若劳动力市场紧张或其他因素对物价稳定构成风险时，采取先发制人的行动很可能是必要的。
调整措辞阐述在就业与通胀目标无法兼顾时的政策取向，即采取平衡策略推进双重目标。修订后的声明更贴近 2012 年原始表述框架。修订后的声明更贴近 2012 年原始表述框架。联储表示会考虑通胀与就业目标偏离的程度，以及各自回归至符合双重使命水平所需的不同时间跨度。
鲍威尔讲话释放了较为明确的9月降息的信号，我们维持年内再降息两次的预测，联储降息路径最关键的参考指标将是非农数据。7月非农就业数据显示就业市场下行风险加大，鲍威尔的讲话释放了较为明确的9月降息信号。9月会议前将公布8月非农和8月通胀数据，我们认为即使两个数据超预期，对联储9月降息决策的影响也可能有限，即使数据强劲，9月也会预防性降息。往前看，正如鲍威尔所强调的，未来的降息路径取决于后续数据的表现。如果四季度就业数据改善，或者通胀明显超预期，联储明年的降息节奏可能受影响。考虑到关税上升的拖累仍在、就业市场整体仍然存在风险，而通胀的传导较为温和（参见《关税传导或更为显性但短期影响可控》，2025/8/18），基准情形下，我们认为联储在9月降息后，四季度仍可能再次降息，2025年下半年降息2次。
此外，4季度开始更应关注FOMC委员和联储主席人选变化对明年货币政策方向和美元走势的影响。目前特朗普已经任命Miran暂时出任美联储理事，预计在9月后能够通过参议院的确认，其加入联储将加大鲍威尔所面临的压力。近期特朗普也加大了对联储理事Cook的施压力度，Cook目前否认将提前离职，特朗普后续是否会以Cook涉嫌抵押欺诈为由将其解雇仍然需要密切关注。此外，9月以后特朗普还可能给出联储主席的明确人选，市场对新主席的关注度将上升，相应的，鲍威尔讲话的影响力可能会下降。如果新任联储主席被市场认为缺乏独立性，可能导致美元被抛售。因此，四季度开始，关注联储人事变化对货币政策以及美元走势的影响。
风险提示：通胀再度回升导致联储鹰派超预期，高利率下美国金融风险暴露。
附录：联储长期目标和货币政策策略的声明（2025年VS 2024年）
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.
Employment, inflation, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. The Committee’s monetary policy strategy is designed to promote maximum employment and stable prices across a broad range of economic conditions. Monetary policy plays an important role in stabilizing the economy in response to these disturbances. Employment, inflation, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Monetary policy plays an important role in stabilizing the economy in response to these disturbances. The Committee’s primary means of adjusting the stance of monetary policy is through changes in the target range for the federal funds rate. The Committee judges that the level of the federal funds rate consistent with maximum employment and price stability over the longer run has declined relative to its historical average. Therefore, the federal funds rate is likely to be constrained by its effective lower bound more frequently than in the past. Owing in part to the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound, the Committee judges that downward risks to employment and inflation have increased. The Committee is prepared to use its full range of tools to achieve its maximum employment and price stability goals, particularly if the federal funds rate is constrained by its effective lower bound.
Durably achieving maximum employment fosters broad-based economic opportunities and benefits for all Americans. The Committee views maximum employment as the highest level of employment that can be achieved on a sustained basis in a context of price stability.
The maximum level of employment is a broad-based and inclusive goal that is not directly measurable and changes over time owing largely to nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee’s policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the shortfalls of employment from its maximum level, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments.
Price stability is essential for a sound and stable economy and supports the well-being of all Americans. The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee reaffirms its judgment that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate. The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee’s ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time. The Committee is prepared to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.
Monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity, employment, and prices with a lag. In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks over time to mitigate shortfalls of employment from the Committee’s assessment of its maximum level and deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal. Moreover, sustainably achieving maximum employment and price stability depends on a stable financial system. Therefore, the Committee’s policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee’s goals.
The Committee’s employment and inflation objectives are generally complementary. However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it takes into account the employment shortfalls and inflation deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate, taking into account the extent of departures from its goals and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. The Committee recognizes that employment may at times run above real-time assessments of maximum employment without necessarily creating risks to price stability.
The Committee intends to review these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January, and to undertake roughly every 5 years a thorough public review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices.
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